Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments by Sylvain Chassang et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
SELECTIVE TRIALS:
A PRINCIPAL-AGENT APPROACH TO RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS
Sylvain Chassang








We are particularly indebted to Abhijit Banerjee, Roland Benabou, and Je˙ff Ely for advice and encouragement.
The paper bene˝ted greatly from conversations with Attila Ambrus, Nava Ashraf, Oriana Bandiera,
Angus Deaton, Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Greg Fischer, Kripa Freitas, Drew Fudenberg, Justin
Grimmer, Rema Hanna, Jim Heckman, Johannes Hörner, Dean Karlan, Michael Kremer, Guido Imbens,
John Ledyard, Maggie McConnell, Stephen Morris, Muriel Niederle, Marcin Peski, Nancy Qian, Antonio
Rangel, Imran Rasul, Dan Scharfstein, Sam Schulhofer-Wohl, Jesse Shapiro, Monica Singhal, Andy
Skrzypacz, Francesco Sobbrio, Lars Stole, Chris Woodruff and Eric Zitzewitz, as well as seminar
participants at Boston University, Brown, Caltech, Chicago Booth, Harvard/MIT, HEC Lausanne,
Johns Hopkins, LSE, MPSA, NYU Stern, the Radcliffe Institute, Stanford, Stockholm School of Economics,
SWET, UT Austin, Washington University in St. Louis, and Yale. Part of this work was done while
Chassang visited the Department of Economics at Harvard, and he gratefully acknowledges their hospitality.
Paul Scott provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Sylvain Chassang, Gerard Padro i Miquel, and Erik Snowberg. All rights reserved. Short
sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided
that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments
Sylvain Chassang, Gerard Padro i Miquel, and Erik Snowberg




We study the design of randomized controlled experiments in environments where outcomes are significantly
affected by unobserved effort decisions taken by the subjects(agents). While standard randomized
controlled trials (RCTs) are internally consistent, the unobservability of effort provision compromises
external validity. We approach trial design as a principal-agent problem and show that natural extensions
of RCTs -which we call selective trials- can help improve the external validity of experiments. In particular,
selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment, effort, and the interaction of treatment and
effort. Moreover, they can help experimenters identify when measured treatment effects are affected
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This paper studies the design of experimental trials when outcomes depend signicantly on
unobserved eort decisions taken by subjects (agents).1 Even in an ideal setting where the
experimenter (principal) can randomly and independently assign an arbitrarily large number
of agents to the treatment and control groups, unobserved eort limits the informativeness
of randomized controlled trials (RCTs). For example, if a technology's measured returns
are low, it is dicult to distinguish whether this occurred because true returns are low or
because most agents believe they are low and therefore put no eort into using the technology.
Moreover, to the extent that eort responds to beliefs, and beliefs respond to information,
this makes it dicult to predict the returns to the technology on the same population as
it becomes better informed. In other words, unobserved eort is a source of heterogeneity
in treatment eects, and is a signicant challenge to the external validity of experimental
trials.2
We propose simple extensions to RCTs|which we call selective trials|that improve the
external validity of trial results without sacricing robustness or internal validity. These ex-
perimental designs can be used to determine the extent to which inappropriate eort or erro-
neous beliefs aect treatment eects. We provide a systematic analysis of trial design using a
principal-agent framework with both adverse selection|an agent's type is unobserved|and
moral hazard|an agent's eort is unobserved. However, unlike the standard principal-agent
framework, our principal's goal is to maximize information about a technology's returns (in
the sense of Blackwell) rather than prots. The principal seeks to achieve this objective
through single-agent mechanisms that assign agents to treatments of varying sophistication
based on the message they send.
1Throughout the paper we call experimental subjects agents, and call the experimenter the principal.
Following usual conventions, we refer to the principal as she and an agent as he.
2Unobserved eort is an issue whether a trial is open|agents know their treatment status|or blinded|
agents' treatment status is obscured by giving the control group a placebo. See Duo et al. (2008b) for a
more detailed description of RCTs and the external validity issues frequently associated with them.
2These mechanisms improve on RCTs for two reasons. First, they let agents express
preferences over their treatment by probabilistically selecting themselves in and out of the
treatment group at a cost (hence the name selective trials).3 This makes implicit, unob-
served selection an explicit part of the experimental design. Second, these mechanisms allow
for treatments of varying richness: in open trials, treatment corresponds to access to the
new technology; in blind trials, treatment corresponds to an undisclosed allotment of the
technology, as well as information over the likelihood of having been allotted the technology;
and in incentivized trials, treatment corresponds to access to the technology as well as an
incentive (or insurance) contract based on outcomes.
Our results fall into two broad categories. Given a type of treatment (open, blind or incen-
tivized), our rst set of results establishes conditions under which a large sample mechanism
is maximally informative and examines the small sample properties of such mechanisms.
We show that a mechanism is maximally informative if and only if it identies an agent's
preferences over all possible treatment assignments and, given preferences, still assigns each
agent to the treatment or control group with positive probability. Thus, our designs encap-
sulate the data generated by a standard randomized controlled trial. These designs can be
implemented in a number of intuitive ways, such as a menu of lotteries or utilizing the design
of Becker et al. (1964), referred to as the BDM mechanism.
In small samples, selective trials have some costs because any mechanism that identies
agents' preferences in a strictly incentive compatible way must assign agents with a higher
value for the technology to the treatment group with higher probability. This oversampling
of high value agents is an additional constraint which can reduce power. However, these
sampling costs can be reduced by weakening incentives for truthfully reporting preferences,
so the experimenter can strike a balance between sampling costs and the precision of the
preference data that is obtained. As we detail later, these results contribute to recent
3For simplicity, we focus on monetary costs, but the mechanisms can be based on non-monetary costs
For example, agents could choose between lines of dierent lengths to place themselves into the treatment
group with dierent probabilities.
3discussions over the usefulness of charging subjects for access to treatment in RCTs (see for
instance Cohen and Dupas (2010), Dupas (2009b), or Ashraf et al. (forthcoming)).
Our second class of results characterizes what can be inferred from selective trials, and
highlights how they contribute to the ongoing discussion on the external validity of eld
experiments (Deaton, 2010; Imbens, 2010).4 By eliciting agents' value for the technology,
open selective trials recover the distribution of returns as a function of willingness to pay.
As a result, open trials provide a simple and robust way to recover the marginal treatment
eects (MTEs) introduced by Heckman and Vytlacil (2005). While MTEs can be used
to extrapolate the treatment eect of policies aecting the accessibility of goods, such as
subsidies, they do not typically allow projections about interventions that alter beliefs and
eort provision, such as informational campaigns.
Selective trials go beyond MTEs and identify deep parameters by letting agents express
preferences over richer treatments. Specically, we consider blind trials where treatment
status is hidden from agents by giving the control group a placebo. This allows us to vary
the information an agent has over his treatment status. As a result we can identify the pure
eect of treatment, as well as the agents' real and perceived returns to eort.5 As blind trials
4In addition, selective trials may alleviate subversions of experimental protocol discussed in Deaton (2010).
That is, explicitly allowing the agents to select themselves in and out of treatment may reduce the number
of agents in the control group who obtain the treatment by other means, as well as the number of agents in
the treatment group that refuse to be treated. Furthermore, the principal may use the information revealed
by agents' preferences to increase monitoring of agents who expressed a high value for treatment but were
assigned to the control group.
Note that the percentage of agents rejecting, or opting-in to, treatment is often signicant. For example,
45% of the people Dupas and Robinson (2009) opened a savings account for never made a deposit, 72%
of the people oered a commitment saving product by Ashraf et al. (2006) rejected it, and in a study of
educational vouchers in Columbia, Angrist et al. (2002) nd that 25% of those randomly denied a voucher
were awarded other scholarships, and 10% of those who were oered vouchers declined them.
5Although uncommon in economics, blind trials are quite common in medicine. For a brief review of
RCTs in medicine see Stolberg et al. (2004). Jadad and Enkin (2007) provides a more comprehensive
review. Selective trials nest preference trials, which have generally been used in medicine to assess the ethics
of using randomized controlled trials. A common implementation of preference trials compares outcomes
from a standard randomized trial to results from a trial in which agents can perfectly select their treatment
status. This provides information about whether or not, in a given environment, letting subjects choose their
preferred treatment confounds the evaluation of treatment eects. Our work shows that eliciting preferences
is not incompatible with randomization, and that preferences carry information that facilitates inference
from treatment eects. For more on preference trials, see Zelen (1979); Flood et al. (1996); Silverman and
4are rarely used in economics|often for want of a convincing, ethical placebo|we extend
the analysis to incentivized trials in which agents are informed of their treatment status,
but receive dierent transfers conditional on observable outcomes. Under mild assumptions,
this produces information similar to that produced by selective blind trials. While the
experimental designs we propose may pose some implementation challenges, many elements
of selective trials have already been used successfully in eld studies (see, for example, Ashraf
et al., forthcoming; Karlan and Zinman, 2010; Cohen and Dupas, 2010; Berry et al., 2010),
and we believe that the designs we suggest can be gainfully applied in practice.
The literature on treatment eects, based on a statistical framework quite dierent from
our principal-agent approach, has largely focused on much simpler eort decisions and the ex
post analysis of data. In this literature, agents are usually viewed as either taking treatment
or not (with the notable exceptions of Angrist and Imbens (1995) and Jin and Rubin (2008)),
and more importantly, this decision is assumed to be observable (or suciently correlated
with exogenous observable variables) and based on correct beliefs about returns (Imbens
and Angrist, 1994; Angrist et al., 1996; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005). In contrast, we
consider eort decisions which are unobservable, high dimensional, and can be the result of
incorrect beliefs. Additionally, most previous approaches, even those which rely|as we do|
on decision theory, focus on modeling data from an RCT after it has been run (Philipson
and Desimone, 1997; Philipson and Hedges, 1998).6 We take an ex ante perspective and
propose designs for experimental trials that can help understand how beliefs and eort aect
treatment eects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses a simple example to illustrate the main
points of the paper. Section 3 denes the general framework. Section 4 investigates selective
open trials. Section 5 turns to blind selective trials and shows how they can be used to
identify true and perceived returns to eort. Section 6 extends the analysis to incentivized
Altman (1996); King et al. (2005); Jadad and Enkin (2007); Tilbrook (2008).
6There is a large literature on experimental design that considers issues that we largely take for granted,
such as the ecient implementation of randomization.
5trials and shows that under reasonable assumptions they can be as informative as blind
selective trials, without placebos. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the limitations of
and future directions for our approach to designing randomized controlled experiments.
2 An Example
This section uses a highly stylized example to illustrate the paper's main points. While
the model in this section is simple, the notation and concepts will carry through to the
more general framework unless specically noted. To x ideas, we use the example of an
experiment evaluating the health eects of a water treatment product.7
2.1 A Simple Model
There are innitely many agents indexed by i 2 N. Each agent has a treatment status
i 2 f0;1g. If agent i is in the treatment group, i = 1, and he is given the water treatment
product. Otherwise i = 0 and the agent is in the control group.
Agent i obtains a nal outcome yi 2 f0;1g, which can be measured by the principal. In
our example yi = 1 indicates that the agent has remained healthy. The probability that an
agent remains healthy depends on both treatment and eort:
Prob(yi = 1jei;i) = q0 + Reii (1)
where ei 2 [0;1] is agent i's decision of whether or not to put eort into using the product,
R 2 [RL;RH] is the component of the technology's return that is common to all agents and
7It should be noted that while our main focus is on the use of RCTs in medical, public health and
development contexts, our analysis applies to most environments involving decentralized experimentation.
For instance, if a rm wants to try a new way to organize production, specic plant managers will have
to decide how much eort to put towards implementing it. The rm's CEO is in the same position as the
principal in our framework, and must guess the eort exerted by his managers when evaluating returns to
the new production scheme. Similarly, if a school board wants to experiment with a new program, individual
teachers and administrators will have to decide how much eort to expend on implementing the program.
6q0 is the unknown baseline likelihood of staying healthy over the study period, which will be
controlled for using randomization. Agents have dierent types t which characterize their
beliefs over returns R. We denote by Rt = EtR the returns expected by an agent of type
t. The distribution FRt, of expectations Rt in the population, need not be known to the
principal or the agents.8
We assume throughout that eort is private and cannot be monitored by the principal.
In other words, we assume that all observable dimensions of eort are already controlled for,
and focus on those dimensions that are not observable. For example, with a water treatment
product, an experimenter may be able to determine whether or not the agent has treated
water in his home, but it may be much more dicult to determine if the agent drinks treated
water when away from home.9
Given eort ei, agent i's expected utility is given by
Et[yijei]   cei; (2)
where c 2 (RL;RH) is the agents' cost of eort.10 In our example, this may be the cost of
remembering to use the product, the social cost of refusing untreated water, or disliking the
taste of treated water. In addition, we assume each agent has quasilinear preferences with
respect to money. An agent's willingness to pay for treatment is Vt = maxfRt  c;0g, which
we assume is less than some value Vmax for all agents.
We focus initially on open trials where agents know their treatment status before making
eort decisions, and contrast two ways of running trials: a standard RCT, where agents are
randomly assigned to the treatment group with probability , and a selective open trial which
8We focus on heterogenous beliefs as a source of heterogenous behavior and heterogenous returns as, in
this setting, convincingly identifying true returns to treatment would be particularly valuable and have a
large eect on behavior. The general framework, described in Section 3, allows for general, idiosyncratic,
returns.
9Still, as Duo et al. (2010) shows, innovative monitoring technologies can be quite useful. To the extent
that monitoring is possible, it should be done.
10In this example, allowing c to vary with type does not change any of the results.
7lets agents express preferences over treatment by selecting their probability of treatment.
We implement a selective trial here using the BDM mechanism:
 The agent sends a message m 2 [0;Vmax] indicating his willingness to pay for treatment.
 A price p to obtain treatment is drawn according to a distribution with convex support,
and c.d.f. Fp such that 0 < Fp(0) < Fp(Vmax) < 1.
 If m  p, the agent obtains the treatment at price p, otherwise, the agent is in the
control group and no transfers are made.
Note that a higher message m, increases an agent's probability of treatment, Fp(m), as well
as his expected payment:
R
pm pdFp.
2.2 The Limits of RCTs and the Value of Self-Selection
Inference from Randomized Controlled Trials. We begin by considering the informa-
tion produced by an RCT. If agent i is in the treatment group, he chooses to expend eort
(e = 1) if and only if Rt  c. Hence, the average treatment eect identied by an RCT is11

RCT = E[yj = 1]   E[yj = 0]
= E[q0 + R  1Rtcj = 1]   E[q0j = 0]
= R  Prob(Rt > c) = R  (1   FRt(c)):
When the distribution of agents' expectations FRt is known, then an RCT will identify R.
However, in most cases FRt is not known, and average treatment eect RCT provides a
garbled signal of the underlying returns R. If the outcomes of agents in the treatment group
11In the medical literature, R is referred to as the ecacy of a treatment, and RCT, which identies the
average treatment eect, is referred to as the eectiveness of the treatment. While eectiveness varies with
the beliefs and eort decisions of agents in the experimental population, ecacy does not. Moreover, R is
similar to the complier average causal eect (CACE) which Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist et al.
(1996) have shown is identied if eort is observable and can only take on one of two values.
8are not particularly good compared to agents in the control group, the principal does not
know if this is because the water treatment product is not particularly useful, or because
the agents did not put sucient eort towards using the treatment.
Inference from Open Selective Trials. We now turn to selective trials and show they
are more informative than RCTs.
The selective trial described above elicits agents' willingness to pay and, conditional on
a given willingness to pay V , generates non-empty treatment and control groups. As Fp has
convex support, it is a strictly dominant strategy for an agent to submit a message m = Vt
equal to his willingness to pay for treatment. Thus, an agent with value Vt has probability
Fp(Vt) of being in the treatment group and probability 1   Fp(Vt) of being in the control
group. Both of these quantities are strictly positive as 0 < Fp(0) < Fp(Vmax) < 1.12
The selective trial described above provides us with the set of local instruments needed
by Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) to estimate marginal treatment eects (MTEs). That is,
for any willingness to pay V , we are able to estimate,

MTE(V )  E[yj = 1;Vt = V ]   E[yj = 0;Vt = V ]
= E[yj = 1;mt = V ]   E[yj = 0;mt = V ]
which can be used to perform policy simulations in which the distribution of types is constant
but access to the technology is changed|for example, subsidies. Moreover, MTEs can be
integrated to recover the average treatment eect identied by an RCT.
In the current environment, because willingness to pay is a good signal of future use,
MTEs can be used to identify the true returns R. Specically, all agents with value Vt > 0
also believe Rt   c > 0 and hence, put eort e = 1 towards using the technology.13 Hence,
12Note also that agents with higher value are treated with higher probability. This matters for the precision
of estimates in small samples, a point we return to in Section 4.
13Note that in this very simple environment the same result is obtained by setting a price p and selecting a




, and then examining the treatment eect for those that
9it follows that

MTE(V > 0) = E[q0 + R  et j = 1;Vt > 0]   E[q0j = 0;Vt > 0]
= R:
A selective trial identies the average treatment eect, MTEs, and true returns R. Hence,
it is more informative than an RCT, which only identies the average treatment eect.
The true return R and the distribution of valuations Vt have several policy uses. First,
knowing R allows us to simulate the treatment eect for a population where everyone puts
in the appropriate amount of eort. Second, these variables allow us to estimate the returns
to increasing usage within a given population. Third, and nally, the data provided by the
selective trial can be used to inform agents and disrupt learning traps more eectively than
data from an RCT. For example, imagine that the true returns to the technology are high,
but most agents believe they are low. In that case, an RCT will measure low returns to
the treatment and will not convince agents that they should be expending more eort. In
contrast, the data generated by a selective trial would identify that true returns are high,
lead agents to update their beliefs, and eciently adopt the water treatment product.14
2.3 Richer Treatments
In the previous subsection, a selective trial identied true returns because willingness to pay
was a good predictor of future usage. However, as our continuing example shows, this will
not always be the case. Thus, MTEs are generally not sucient to infer whether beliefs are
aecting measured treatment eects. However, more sophisticated selective trials such as
blind selective trials and incentivized selective trials can be used to recover true returns.
pay the price p. The idea that a higher price will select individuals who will use a product more intensely
has been in the economics literature for some time and is closely related to classic selection models. See Roy
(1951) and Oster (1995).
14For more on the eect of appropriate information on behavior, see Thornton (2008), Dupas (2009a) or
Nguyen (2009).
10We modify the example so that the returns R to the technology include both a baseline
return and returns to eort: R = (Rb;Re) 2 R2. In the context of a water treatment
product, Rb could be the baseline returns to using the water treatment product only when
it is convenient to do so, and Re the additional returns to using it more thoroughly (for
example, bringing treated water when away from home). Success rates given eort and
treatment status are:
Prob(y = 1j = 0;e) = q0
Prob(y = 1j = 1;e) = q0 + Rb + eRe:
An agent of type t has expectation (Rb;t;Re;t) over returns R = (Rb;Re), and expends eort
if and only if Re;t  c. Therefore, an agent's willingness to pay for treatment is given by
Vt = Rb;t + maxfRe;t   c;0g.
Inference from Open Selective Trials. We have already shown that open selective trials
can identify treatment eects conditional on willingness to pay. However, in the current
environment, willingness to pay is no longer a good signal of eort. Indeed, there are now
two reasons why an agent might value the treatment: he believes that a thorough use of
the product has high returns (Re;t is high)|the channel emphasized in Section 2.2|or he
believes that a casual use of the water treatment product is sucient to obtain high returns
and that thorough use brings little additional return (Rb;t is high, but Re;t is low). Hence,
agents who are willing to pay because they think baseline returns are high need not be the
agents who will actually expend eort. Formally, a selective trial still identies MTEs,

MTE(V ) = Rb + ReProb[Re;t  cjRb;t + maxfRe;t   c;0g = V ];
11but these are generally not sucient to recover Rb and Re.15 As a result, MTEs are insu-
cient to simulate the returns of a population of agents that all expended appropriate eort,
or more generally, the returns to increasing the eort of agents. Nor do MTEs provide the
information needed for the agents to infer true returns.
Blind Selective Trials. In a blind trial, the agent does not know his treatment status
 2 f0;1g at the time of eort, but rather knows his probability  2 [0;1] of having been
assigned to the treatment group. Open trials are blind trials where  is either 0 or 1.
Given a probability  of being treated, the agent puts eort if and only if Re;t   c > 0.
The agent's expected value for being treated with probability  is
Vt() = Rb;t + maxfRe;t   c;0g:
We depart from standard blind trials in a simple but fundamental way: while standard blind
trials keep  xed and do not infer anything from the specic value of  used, we allow  to
vary and use both willingness to pay and outcomes at dierent values of  for inference.
As with open trials, willingness to pay can be elicited using a BDM-type mechanism.
However, as willingness to pay, Vt(), now depends on , the mechanism in Section 2.1 is
implemented after the agent is asked to send a message m() for each possible value of . A
value of  is drawn from a c.d.f. F, which has mass points at 0 and 1, and p is independently
drawn from a c.d.f. Fp, as before. If m()  p, the agent pays p and is allotted the treatment
with probability ; otherwise, the agent is in the control group and no transfers are made.
A rst advantage of blind trials is that, unlike open trials, an agent's actual treatment
status  and his belief over his treatment status are dierent. This allows for a robust
identication of baseline returns Rb. If an agent is assigned a probability of treatment  > 0
15For instance, it is not possible to distinguish a situation in which returns to eort are equal to Re and
a proportion V of agents with value V puts eort, from a situation in which returns to eort are 2Re and
a proportion

2V of agents with value V puts eort.
12low enough that RH < c, he will not expend any eort. Still, a proportion  > 0 of these
agents do receive treatment while a proportion 1    > 0 do not. Hence we can identify Rb




















A second advantage of blind trials is that the agents' value mapping Vt() allows identi-
cation of which agents expend eort when treated for sure. Let t  1
2Vt(=1) Vt(=1=2).
Given that Vt( = 0) = 0, t is the value that an agent with belief  = 1=2 is willing to pay






















i.e. the agent has positive willingness to pay for information. Conversely, if an agent does
not intend to put eort when  = 1 then there is no value for information, and t = 0.
Hence, the sign of t provides a simple test for whether or not the agent would put eort
given treatment. Since F puts positive mass at  = 0 and  = 1 and Fp(0) > 0, given
any value function, a positive mass of agents get  = 0 and a positive mass of agents get
 = 1. Thus, provided that some agents satisfy t > 0, we can identify Re using either of
the following expressions:
Re = E[yj=1;t>0; =1]   E[yj=1;t=0; =1]









Incentivized Selective Trials. We now show that incentivized trials can provide the
experimenter with similar information to blind trials. This is useful as in many areas of eco-
13nomic interest, blind trials are not practical due to the lack of suitable, or ethical, placebos.
In an incentivized selective trial, the agent obtains a treatment status  2 f0;1g, makes
a xed transfer p (which can be positive or negative), and receives a bonus (or penalty) w
in the event that y = 1. Note that if p > 0 and w > 0, then the agent is being assigned an
incentive contract. If instead p < 0 and w < 0, the agent is assigned an insurance contract.
Given a bonus level w, the agent puts eort if and only if (1 + w)Re;t   c > 0. In turn,
the agent's willingness to pay for treatment given bonus w is
Vt(w) = (1 + w)Rb;t + maxf(1 + w)Re;t   c;0g:
As before, the mapping w 7! Vt(w) can be elicited using a variant of the BDM mechanism.
Incentivized trials allow us to evaluate baseline returns in a straightforward manner. When
oered a full insurance contract w =  1, the agent will put eort e = 0 so that
Rb = E[yjw= 1; =1]   E[yjw= 1; =0]:
In turn, notice that for any type t with Re;t > 0, there exists a value wt such that whenever




   
w>wt
= Re;t + Rb;t > Rb;t =
@Vt
@w
   
w<wt
:
Additionally, this last expression allows us to identify the agent's subjective beliefs over
baseline returns and returns to eort (Rb;t;Re;t). Pick some value w suciently high that it
induces some agents to put eort, and construct statistic w   wt. Returns to eort can be
identied by
Re = E[yjw=w;w   wt>0; =1]   E[yjw=w;w   wt<0; =1]
= E[yjw=w;w   wt>0; =1]   E[yjw= 1;w   wt>0; =1]:
14Just like blind trials, incentivized trials identify true returns R = (Rb;Re).
Altogether, this section suggests that while unobserved eort is an issue for the external
validity of standard randomized controlled trials, appropriate ex ante trial design|rather
than ex post data treatment|may help in alleviating these concerns. However, these results
are obtained using a particularly simple framework, and their robustness must be investi-
gated. The remainder of the paper extends the analysis to a very general framework to
provide systematic results about which mechanisms are the most informative, what their
small sample properties are, and what can be inferred from the data they generate.
3 A General Framework
We now generalize the framework used in our example. Once again, there are innitely
many agents, indexed by i 2 N.16 Returns to the technology are described by parameter
R 2 R  R.
Types. Each agent i has a type t 2 T, which includes a belief over returns R, as well
as factors that might aect behavior and outcomes, such as idiosyncratic costs of eort,
idiosyncratic returns, and beliefs over such factors. We assume that agents are exchangeable,
so that their types are i.i.d. draws from some distribution  2 (T), which is itself a random
variable. A prole of types is given by t 2 T N. For concision we omit publicly observable
traits, but it is straightforward to allow for them.
Outcomes and Success Rates. Agent i obtains an outcome yi 2 f0;1g.17 An agent's true
and perceived likelihoods of success (that is, Prob(y = 1)) depend on his type, the aggregate
returns to the technology and the agent's eort choice e 2 E, where E is a compact subset
16We will discuss how our results change with nitely many agents.
17As Appendix A shows, this greatly simplies notation but is not essential to our results.






where q(R;t;;e) is the true success rate of an agent of type t (this allows for idiosyncratic
returns) while qt(;e) is the probability of success perceived by an agent of type t.19 We
assume that q and qt are continuous with respect to eort e.
Preferences. Given eort ei, treatment status i, monetary transfer pi, and nal outcome
yi, agent i's utility is u(yi;ti)   c(ei;ti)   pi.20
Assignment Mechanisms. We distinguish three ways to assign treatment:
1. Open selective trials are mechanisms Go = (Mo;o) where Mo is a set of messages and
o : Mo ! (f0;1g  R) maps individual messages to a probability distribution over
treatment status i and transfers pi.
2. Blind selective trials are mechanisms Gb = (Mb;b) where Mb is a set of messages and
b : Mb ! ([0;1]  R) maps messages to a probability distribution over uncertain
treatment status i (where i = Prob(i = 1)) and transfers pi.
3. Incentivized selective trials are mechanisms Gw = (Mw;w) where Mw is a set of
messages and w : Mw ! (f0;1gRR) maps messages to a probability distribution
18In most settings, this eort decision is multidimensional. For instance, in the case of fertilizer, it is not
enough for agents to just expend eort spreading fertilizer. As Duo et al. (2008a) highlight, eort is needed
to choose the appropriate seeds to go with the fertilizer, learn how much and when to water the crops, and
to learn how much fertilizer gives the highest returns at the lowest cost. In this case it is natural to think of
eort as a vector, where the rst component corresponds to picking the right seeds, the second to the right
amount of fertilizer, the third to properly applying it, and so on.
19Note that although returns conditional on the state R are common knowledge, heterogeneous priors
allow for arbitrary disagreements between the principal and the agents.
20Note that pi can be negative, or that all transfers can be rescaled by a xed amount to improve partici-
pation. See Appendix A for a treatment of the case where agents have non-quasilinear preferences.
16over treatment status i, a xed transfer pi from the agent to the principal, and a bonus
wi transferred from the principal to the agent conditional on yi = 1.
Note that these are single agent mechanisms. Agent i's nal assignment depends only on
his message, and not on messages sent by others (see Section 7 for a discussion of multi-
agent mechanisms). We denote by (m) = Prob( = 1jm) the likelihood of being given
the treatment when sending message m. We focus largely on mechanisms G such that -
almost surely, every agent i has a dominant message mG(ti). In all these designs agents can
probabilistically select their assignment using messages, hence, the name selective trials.
Informativeness of Mechanisms. We evaluate mechanisms according to their informa-
tiveness, in the sense of Blackwell. We say that a mechanism G is at least as informative as
a mechanism G0 (denoted by G0  G) if the data generated by G0 can be simulated using
only data generated by G.
Specically, denote by ai the assignment given to agent i by whichever mechanism is
chosen. The principal observes data dG = (mi;ai;yi)i2N. Denote DG the set of possible data
sequences generated by mechanism G. Mechanism G is at least as informative as mechanism
G0, denoted by G0  G, if and only if there exists a xed data manipulation procedure
h : DG ! (DG0) such that for all t 2 T N;R 2 R, h(dG(t;R))  dG0(t;R):
This notion of informativeness is easier to work with in environments with innite sam-
ples, as this focuses on issues of identication rather than issues of statistical power. However,
this denition also applies in the case of nitely many agents.
4 Open Selective Trials
In open selective trials an agent is assigned a treatment status  and a transfer p based
on message m. Given this assignment (;p), the indirect utility of an agent with type t is
17Vt()   p where,
Vt() = max
e2E
qt(;e)u(y=1;t) + [1   qt(;e)]u(y=0;t)   c(e;t):
Since ow utility is identied up to a constant, we can normalize the value of being in the
control group Vt( = 0) to zero for every type. Hence Vt  Vt( = 1) denotes the agent's
willingness to pay for being in the treatment group. For simplicity we assume that there
exists a known value Vmax 2 R > 0 such that for all t 2 T, Vt 2 ( Vmax;Vmax) and that
the distribution over values induced by the distribution of types  admits a density. The
optimal eort for type t given treatment status  is denoted by e(;t).21
4.1 Information Production in Open Selective Trials
A rst benchmark result highlights the fact that selective trials are natural extensions of
RCTs. An RCT is a mechanism G0 = (;;0). As M = ;, no messages are sent, all agents
are assigned to the treatment group with the same probability 0 2 (0;1), and there are no
transfers.
Fact 1 (full support sampling). Consider a mechanism G = (M;). If there exists  > 0
such that for all m 2 M, (m) 2 (;1   ), then G0  G.
Recalling that (m)  Prob( = 1jm), Fact 1 shows that if every type has a positive
probability of being in the treatment or control group, then it is as informative as an RCT.
Note this holds for any  > 0 because the sample size is innite. We analyze small sample
issues in Section 4.2.
As Plott and Zeiler (2005) and others have shown, information elicited in non-incentive
compatible ways can be unreliable. Moreover, as Kremer and Miguel (2007) and others
have noted, reported beliefs about a technology's return are often uncorrelated with use.
21At this stage, whether optimal eort is unique or not does not matter. We explicitly assume a unique
optimal eort in Sections 5 and 6 to apply a convenient version of the Envelope Theorem.
18Therefore, we focus on strictly incentive compatible assignment mechanisms|assignment
mechanisms such that -almost every agent has a strictly preferred message.22
Our next result shows that an open selective trial is a most informative trial if it identies
each agent's value Vt, and, conditional on any expressed valuation, assigns a positive mass
of agents to both the treatment and control group. Moreover, these are necessary conditions
for an open selective trial trial to maximize informativeness.
Proposition 1 (most informative mechanisms). Any strictly incentive compatible mecha-
nism G identies at most value Vt (Vt = Vt0 ) mG(t) = mG(t0)).
Whenever G identies values Vt (mG(t) = mG(t0) ) Vt = Vt0) and satises full support
(0 < infm (m) and supm (m) < 1), then G0  G for any strictly incentive compatible
mechanism G0.
It follows that open selective trials can at most identify the distribution of returns con-
ditional on the agents' valuation, which can be used to construct marginal treatment eects
(MTEs). It is important to note that these mechanisms identify MTEs independently of
the experimenter's beliefs. The identication of MTEs in observational data requires a local
instrument, that is, an instrument that changes the probability of adoption for agents with
each possible value (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Mott, 2008). Selective trials construct
these local instruments by randomizing treatment conditional on an agent's value. Hence, to
the extent that elicited values are reliable, these mechanisms identify MTEs with a degree
of robustness comparable to that with which RCTs identify average treatment eects.23
22Note that the mechanisms we consider can accommodate surveys. Consider the mechanism G = (T;0)
with message space M = T where the likelihood of treatment is constant and equal to 0 and no transfers are
made. This is essentially an RCT supplemented with a rich survey. Note since assignment does not depend
on the message, truthful revelation of one's type is weakly dominant. Unfortunately, any other message is
also weakly dominant. Hence, data generated by such a mechanism is likely to be unreliable, especially if
guring out one's preferences is costly.
23Note that selective trials also identify higher order moments of the outcome distribution conditional on
treatment status and valuation, which may be useful to researchers.
19Implementing Most Informative Trials. Here we exhibit two straightforward imple-
mentations of most informative selective trials.24 The rst is the BDM mechanisms described
in Section 2.1, with the expanded message space M = [ Vmax;Vmax]. Once again the princi-
pal draws a price pi 2 [ Vmax;Vmax] independently for each agent from a common c.d.f. Fp
with support [ Vmax;Vmax]. If mi  pi, then the agent is assigned ( =1;pi); otherwise, he
is assigned ( =0;0).
Fact 2 (BDM Implementation). Whenever Fp has full support over [ Vmax;Vmax], an agent
with value Vt sends optimal message mBDM = Vt and the BDM mechanism is a most infor-
mative mechanism.






, any agent sending message m is assigned to the treatment group with probability
(m) = 1
2 + m and must make a transfer p(m) = Vmaxm2. One can think of agents as
having a baseline probability of being in the treatment group equal to 1
2 and deciding by
how much they want to deviate from this baseline. An agent with value Vt chooses message
m to maximize








This problem is concave in m, and rst order conditions yield an optimal message Vt=2Vmax
which identies Vt. In addition, every agent is assigned to the treatment and control group
with positive probability. Thus G is a most informative mechanism.
Note that G gives agents higher expected utility than an RCT which assigns agents
to the treatment and control group with probability 1
2. Indeed, for any RCT, a selective
trial that assigns price p = 0 when  is the same as in the RCT will improve the expected
utility of agents. Thus, selective trials may help decrease the number of agents who refuse
randomization, which can approach 50% in medical trials (Jadad and Enkin, 2007).
24See Appendix B for a description of selective trials that elicit coarser information using nite menus of
lotteries.
204.2 The Cost of Running Selective Trials







is strictly increasing in value V . In the BDM mechanism the sampling prole, BDM(V ) =
Fp(V ), is also increasing in V . This is true of any mechanism.
Proposition 2 (monotonicity). Consider a strictly incentive compatible mechanism G. If
agents t and t0 with Vt > Vt0 send messages mG(t) 6= mG(t0), then it must be that (mG(t)) >
(mG(t0)).
Thus, in any selective trial, agents with high values are over-sampled|they have a higher
likelihood of being in the treatment group|and those with low values are under-sampled.
In contrast, RCTs have a at sampling prole. While sampling patterns do not matter when
there is a large number of agents, they can signicantly aect statistical power in small
sample settings.
This issue is related to the recent development economics debate on charging for treat-
ment in RCTs.25 If, as in Ashraf et al. (forthcoming), willingness to pay is correlated with
product usage, then eliciting willingness to pay might be quite useful in understanding true
returns. If, instead, as in the case of Cohen and Dupas (2010), most agents have low values,
and willingness to pay is a poor predictor of actual use, undersampling agents with low
values may signicantly reduce statistical power. Furthermore, in such a setting, willingness
to pay provides little information about intended use.26
We make two contributions to this debate. First, we note that when trade-os between
money and treatment are uninformative, selective trials can and should be based on more
informative trade-os. For instance, if most of the heterogeneity in willingness to pay is
25Note that this literature is motivated by questions of eciency, and is mostly interested in whether
charging for usage improves how well treatment is matched with those who need and use it. This paper
takes a slightly dierent perspective, and is interested in how controlling for willingness to pay improves
inference from experimental trials.
26As Dupas (2010) shows, this can also hinder social learning. Altogether, the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty
Action Lab recommends against charging prices for health technologies. For more details see http://www.
povertyactionlab.org/policy-lessons/health/pricing-health-products.
21driven by wealth and credit constraints, then eliciting willingness to wait, or willingness to
perform a tedious task (like sitting through multiple information sessions) may be a better
indicator of future usage than willingness to pay. If this is the case, selective trials can
and should be designed around such tradeos. However, as we discuss in Section 7, this
likely requires some knowledge of the agents and their environment. The technical details of
extending our approach to non-monetary trade-os can be found in Appendix A.
Second, we show that carefully designed selective trials can reduce the costs of oversam-
pling by reducing the slope of the sampling prole.
Proposition 3 (sampling rates and incentives). For any mechanism G = (M;) and  < 
in (0;1), there exists a mechanism G0 = (M;0) such that G  G0, and for all m 2 M,
0(m) 2 [;]:
The following must also hold. Denoting the expected utility of type t sending message m





0)j  2(   )Vmax:
Proposition 3 implies that it is always possible to reduce the slope of a mechanisms'
sampling prole without aecting identication. Unfortunately, reducing the slope of the
sampling prole also reduces incentives for truth-telling. We illustrate this with mechanisms
(G






, (m) = 1
2 + m and p(m) =
Vmaxm2. As the slope of the sampling prole, , goes to zero, each agent will be sampled
with probability approaching 1
2 and will pay an amount approaching zero, irrespective of the
message he sends. For any  > 0, m = Vt=2Vmax is still a dominant strategy for an agent of
type t. However, if an agent with value Vt instead sends message V=2Vmax, his expected loss
is
U(tjm = Vt=2Vmax)   U(tjm = V=2Vmax) =

4Vmax
(Vt   V )
2;
22which vanishes as the slope of the sampling prole  goes to 0.
The important point is that despite this limitation, the slope of the sampling prole is a
free parameter which the experimenter can and should optimize over. In particular, if the
goal is merely to elicit willingness to pay rather than target the assignment of treatment,
one can avoid excessive under-sampling of low value agents of the kind described by Cohen
and Dupas (2010).
Altogether, this section has shown that open selective trials provide a simple way to
identify MTEs and, more generally, the distribution of returns conditional on willingness to
pay. In addition, while selective trials systematically oversample high value agents, this issue
is negligible when sample size is large or agents are very responsive to incentives. However,
as Section 2 highlighted, willingness to pay need not be a good predictor of actual eort and
MTEs may not allow identication of deep parameters of interest. The following sections
explore richer treatments which can better identify the role of eort.
5 Blind Selective Trials
5.1 Framework and Basic Results
In blind trials the agent is assigned a probability of being in the treatment group,  2 [0;1],
which is disclosed to the agent, and an actual treatment status,  2 f0;1g, which is known
only to the principal. Thus, the pair (;) can be thought of as a full description of an
agent's overall treatment. This class of selective blind trials nests both open trials (where
 2 f0;1g) and standard blind trials, where  is xed.
Assignment Mechanisms. As noted in Section 3, selective blind trials are mechanisms
G = (M;) where  : M ! ([0;1]  R). Given a message m,  assigns the agent a
likelihood of being treated  2 [0;1] which is known to the agent, and a transfer p 2 R.
23An actual treatment status  2 f0;1g is drawn according to . We denote by (jm) the
density over  given message m.










The corresponding eort decision is e(;t), which we assume is unique.27 Consistent with
earlier notation we maintain Vt( = 0) = 0. Note that Vt( = 1) = Vt is the agent's value
for treatment in an open trial. Throughout the section, we keep  as an argument of Vt()
and denote the value of Vt() at ' by Vt(='). Thus, Vt() denotes the entire mapping:
' 7! Vt(=').
Proposition 4 (most informative mechanisms). Any strictly incentive compatible blind
mechanism G identies at most mapping Vt() (that is, Vt() = Vt0() ) mG(t) = mG(t0)).
If G identies Vt() (that is, mG(t) = mG(t0) ) Vt() = Vt0()) and satises inf;m (jm) >
0 then G0  G for any strictly incentive compatible mechanism G0.
A simple generalization of the BDM mechanism is a most informative blind trial. Pick
distributions, F over [0;1], and Fpj over [ Vmax;Vmax] with densities bounded away from
0. The blind BDM Mechanism (bBDM) has message space M = [ Vmax;Vmax][0;1], so that
a message m corresponds to a value function Vt(). Given message m, the principal draws
values  = ' and p according to distributions F and Fpj. If mi(')  p, the agent is assigned
(';p). Otherwise, the agent is assigned (0;0). It is straightforward to show that mbBDM(t) =
Vt(). Additionally, bBDM satises the full sampling constraint inf;m (jm) > 0.
Blind selective trials have two distinct advantages over open selective trials. First, blind
selective trials decorrelate an agent's behavior and treatment status. As detailed in the next
27Using the results of Milgrom and Segal (2002) this allows us to apply the usual Envelope Theorem to
Vt() in Proposition 6. Note that this also implies that e(;t) is continuous in .
24subsection, this will allow the principal to identify whether empirical success rates are being
driven by the agent's behavior or by the treatment itself. Second, by identifying the value
function Vt(), blind selective trials provide useful information about an agent's intended
behavior and his perceived success rate.
5.2 The Value of Decorrelating Beliefs and Treatment Status
Changes in success rates due to treatment come from two sources: the eect of the treatment
itself, and the eect of behavioral changes associated with treatment. In an open trial,
behavioral changes are perfectly correlated with changes in treatment status. As a results,
the eect of treatment and the eect of behavioral changes induced by the expectation of
treatment are hard to distinguish. In contrast, blind trials allow us to disentangle these two
eects by distinguishing an agent's actual treatment status  and his (correct) belief  that
he is being treated.
To disentangle these eects, we focus on E[yjVt();=';], the measured success rate
conditional on the value function Vt(), belief  = ' and treatment status , which is
identied by selective blind trials. This allows identication of MTEs conditioned on the










E[yjVt();='; =0]   E[yjVt();=0; =0]:
As ' approaches zero, an agent's eort converges to e( = 0;t), the eort he would
expend if he knew he was not treated.28 Hence, T identies the returns to treatment
keeping the agent's behavior at its default level e( =0;t). Similarly, as ' approaches one,
the agent's eort converges to e( =1;t), the eort associated with sure treatment. Thus,
28We must use a continuity argument because  = 0 implies  = 0, hence, there is no treatment group.






measures the aggregate treatment eect (conditional on value Vt()), net of the eect of
treatment and behavior alone. That is, I measures the interaction eect between behavior
and treatment. If (5) is positive, then treatment and eort changes are complementary
in producing successful outcomes. If, instead, (5) is negative, this suggests that there is a
negative interaction between treatment and the perceived optimal eort of agents.29
Being able to identify T and B has important practical implications. Consider, for
example, a cholesterol-reducing drug. If subjects react to being in the study by eating more
fatty foods, then the aggregate eect of treatment could be quite small even if the eect
of the drug alone is signicant. In this environment, T is the treatment eect puried of
changes in behavior, that is, the eect of the drug on people who do not change their diet.
It is important to keep in mind when interpreting B and I that these are the direct
and interaction eects at the agents' perceived optimal eort level e( =1;t). In the example
of the cholesterol reducing drug, the agent's perceived optimal behavior is to eat (rather than
abstain from) fatty foods. Consequently, if the measured interaction I is small, this may be
because eort does not improve the success rate of treatment, or because the agent is putting
in low eort. In order to distinguish these two possibilities, we need additional information
on the eort of agents. As the following subsection shows, this is what Vt() provides.
29These quantities can also be conditioned only on the value for sure treatment, Vt. Note also that T
can be estimated using a standard blind RCT with a suciently low value of .
Note that selective blind trials can allow for double-blind designs in which the experimenter has varying
beliefs over the likelihood that an agent is being treated. In some environments, varying the beliefs of the
experimenter may help identify the treatment eect due to variations in experimenter behavior. However,
treating this question properly requires a better understanding of the experimenter's incentive problem,
which we abstract from in this paper.
265.3 The Value of Eliciting Preferences Vt()
As highlighted in Section 2.3, the mapping Vt() can tell us whether and by how much
treatment changes an agent's eort. Recalling that Vt( = 0) = 0, knowledge of Vt()
provides the following simple test.
Proposition 5 (a test of \intention to change behavior").
If e(=0;t) = e(=1;t), then for all ', Vt(=') = 'Vt(=1).
If e(=0;t) 6= e(=1;t), then for all ' 2 (0;1), Vt(=') < 'Vt(=1).
When eort changes with treatment status, the agent gets additional surplus from tailor-
ing his behavior to . The dierence 'Vt(=1) Vt(') is thus the agent's willingness to pay
to learn his actual treatment status, which will be zero if eort is independent of treatment.
Recalling that qt(;e) is an agent of type t's perceived success rate, the value function Vt()
also allows us to estimate an agent's perceived returns to perceived optimal eort.
Proposition 6 (identifying perceived returns to eort). For any value ',
@Vt()
@
   
'
= [qt( =1;e
(';t))   qt( =0;e
(';t))]  [u(y=1;t)   u(y=0;t)]:
In particular, we can compute the ratio of perceived treatment eects, qt( =1;e(';t))  














qt( =1;e('=1;t))   qt( =0;e('=1;t))
qt( =1;e('=0;t))   qt( =0;e('=0;t))
: (6)
This data helps us evaluate whether under-provision of eort is to blame for poor treat-
ment eects. Returning to the example in Section 2, imagine a trial of a water treatment
product known to the experimenter to be eective only if agents use it whenever they drink
water. If measured returns to the treatment are low, there are two competing explanations:
271) the treatment is not eective in the agents' disease environment, 2) agents are not ex-
pending appropriate eort using the product. Agents' perceived returns can help distinguish
these explanations. If perceived returns to eort are high, then the agent is likely to be
expending signicant eort, and it becomes more likely that the treatment is not eective
in a particular disease environment. If, instead, perceived returns are low, it becomes more
likely that the treatment has an eect that is unmeasured due to agents' lack of eort.
In addition, this data may provide some insight into the nature of placebo eects. If the
indirect preferences of a group of agents indicates that they do not intend to change their
behavior (for instance, via Proposition 5), yet exhibit positive behavioral eects (B > 0),
this indicates that the improvement due to a higher probability of uncertain treatment is
aecting the results through unconscious, rather than conscious channels. If instead agents
believe there are high returns to appropriate eort, this suggests that eect B is driven by
conscious decisions.
6 Incentivized Selective Trials
We now show how quantities similar to those identied by blind selective trials can be
identied without a placebo. This can be accomplished using an incentivized selective trial,
which allows agents to express preferences over contracts.30 A fully worked-out numerical
example illustrating inference from incentivized trials is given in Appendix C.
6.1 Framework and Basic Results
Assignment Mechanisms. As noted in Section 3, an incentivized trial is a mechanism
G = (M;), where  : M ! (f0;1g  R  R). Given a message m,  is used to draw a
treatment status , a xed transfer p from the agent, as well as a bonus w (both of which
30For eld experiments using explicit incentives see, for instance, Gertler (2004); Schultz (2004); Volpp et
al. (2006, 2008); Thornton (2008); Kremer et al. (2009).
28may be negative in the case of insurance) transferred to the agent in the event of success.
The pair (;w) can be thought of as an aggregate treatment.
Utility and Eort. The agents' indirect preferences over contracts (;w), denoted by
Vt(;w), are given by
Vt(;w) = max
e2E
qt(;e)[u(y=1;t) + w] + [1   qt(;e)]u(y=0;t)   c(e;t): (7)
We denote by e(;w;t) the induced eort level, and maintain the normalization Vt( =
0;w=0) = 0.
Insurance. A specic value w that will be useful is w0   [u(y = 1;t)   u(y = 0;t)].
When the agent receives a positive baseline transfer for participating in the experiment, the
negative bonus w0 essentially provides the agent with perfect insurance over the outcome
y. When fully insured, the agent will put in the eort that minimizes the cost of his eort
regardless of his treatment status. Note that this level of eort diers from the default
behavior of untreated agents in an open trial, as agents in open trials may still be exerting
some eort to improve their outcomes.
We proceed by assuming that w0 is known to the principal. At the end of the section we
show w0 can be inferred from the mapping Vt(;w) under fairly mild conditions. Alterna-
tively, as w0 is the monetary value of success, it could be calibrated from other data.
6.2 What can be Inferred from Incentivized Trials?
It is straightforward to extend Propositions 1 and 4, which characterize most informative
mechanisms. That is, G is a most informative incentivized trial if it identies Vt(;w) and,
given any message, puts positive density on all possible treatments (;w). As before, the
BDM mechanism can be adapted to identify Vt(;w). Note that the information produced
29by incentivized trials nests that produced by open trials. In particular, Vt( =1;w = 0) = Vt.
As in the case of blind selective trials, incentivized selective trials allow us to decorrelate
treatment and eort, as well as infer an agent's perceptions of how eort aects outcomes.
Incentivized selective trials recover the empirical success rate E[yjV (;w);;w] as a function
of preferences, treatment and incentives. This will be independent of reward w if eort does
not matter for outcomes or if incentives do not aect eort provision.
Isolating returns to treatment and returns to eort. A contract with transfer w0 
 [u(y=1;t) u(y=0;t)] provides the agent with perfect insurance. The optimal eort given
full insurance will be the same regardless of treatment status. Given w0, we can identify two
quantities similar to those discussed in Section 5.2:
Returns to Treatment j No Eort = E[yjVt(;w); =1;w=w0]   E[yjVt(;w); =0;w=w0]
Returns to Eort j Treatment = E[yjVt(;w); =1;w=0]   E[yjVt(;w); =1;w=w0]
Note that here, returns are measured expending minimal eort e(;w0;t) as a baseline,
rather than the default eort level e( =0;w=0;t) exerted by agents in the control group
of an open trial.
Identifying Perceived Returns to Eort. Indirect preferences Vt(;w) also provide
a handle on perceived returns to eort. Recall that qt(;e) denotes the agent's perceived
likelihood of success given treatment status  and eort e.






Given knowledge of w0, this allows us to compute subjective returns to treatment and per-
30ceived appropriate eort:
Perceived Returns to Treatment = qt( =1;w=w0jVt(;w))   qt( =0;w=w0jVt(;w))
Perceived Returns to Eort = qt( =1;w=0jVt(;w))   qt( =1;w=w0jVt(;w)):
Note that if perceived returns to eort are low, this can indicate that an agent plans on
putting little or no eort into using the technology. The principal can use this information
in deciding which agents' usage to monitor more closely.
The monetary equivalent of the cost of eort agents incur to obtain the perceived return





Note that all parameters on the right hand side are identied from data, except perhaps w0.
Identifying the costs incurred by agents can greatly improve inference. In particular it allows
us to distinguish|among agents who think that appropriate eort has high returns|those
who think that only a small amount of eort is sucient to obtain high returns, from those
who think that a signicant amount of eort is necessary to obtain high returns.
Identifying the full insurance contract. One drawback of incentivized trials is that
they rely on identifying the full insurance contract w0. However, this quantity can be iden-
tied under mild additional assumptions.
Fact 3. If outcome y = 1 yields strictly greater utility than y = 0: u(y =1;t) > u(y =0;t)
and agents perceive treatment to always be benecial:
8e0 2 E;9e1 2 E s.t. c(e1;t)  c(e0;t) and qt( =0;e0) < qt( =1;e1)
then w0 = minfw j 8w
0 > w;Vt( =1;w
0) > Vt( =0;w
0)g:
31In words, when treatment facilitates success, the full insurance transfer w0 is the highest
transfer such that the agent no longer values obtaining the treatment. Note that our as-
sumptions rule out cases where the agent believes he may be hurt by the treatment, as well
as environments where the agent only values treatment for reasons other than its impact on
the experimenter's outcome of interest. Whenever the assumptions do not hold, w0 must
be calibrated from alternative data (for example, the expected amount of wages lost when
sick).
7 Discussion
This paper studies the inference and external validity concerns that arise when experimental
subjects take unobserved decisions which can aect outcomes. In particular, since eort
provision is driven by beliefs and beliefs can respond to information, the returns measured
by an RCT may not be representative of the returns that a better informed population
would obtain. To address this issue we take a principal-agent approach to trial design where
the principal maximizes the informativeness of data. This leads us to study selective trials,
which improve on RCTs by letting agents express preferences over treatments of varying
richness. We show that selective trials can identify whether agents' beliefs are reducing
measured treatment eects and separate the returns from treatment, from eort, and from
their interaction.
More generally, this paper advocates a mechanism design approach to randomized con-
trolled trials, which we believe can help build bridges between purely frequentist methods|
largely concerned with robustness and internal validity|and structural methods|which use
models to identify deep parameters necessary to evaluate external validity. While we believe
that this research agenda can yield many useful applications, successfully implementing its
insights is likely to pose a number of interesting challenges, some of which we delineate
below.
32Implementation Issues. In theory, the selective trials described in this paper are robust
and require no specic knowledge on the part of the principal.31 However, there are many
issues to consider when implementing them.
The rst is that trade-os with respect to money need not be the most informative,
and appropriate local knowledge is needed to pick trade-os that are informative of the
agents' intended behavior. For instance, as we highlight in Section 4, when agents are
credit constrained, monetary trade-os may be less informative than willingness to wait or
willingness to perform tedious tasks.
A second, more pernicious, diculty is that boundedly rational agents might not play
dominant strategies, so that the messages they send are not good signals of their actual
values (Keller et al., 1993; Bohm et al., 1997). This issue can be mitigated by giving agents
multiple opportunities to learn how to play the mechanism used to elicit their valuation
before they are asked to express preferences over treatment (Plott and Zeiler, 2005). In
addition, as Section 4 highlights, there are many possible implementations of selective trials
some of which may be more appropriate than others in the eld.
Another delicate implementation issue is that if the act of making choices changes agents'
preferences, selective trials may introduce additional noise. For instance, imagine that when
agents express a strong desire for treatment but do not get it, they will attempt to obtain
treatment by other means, but would not do so if valuation were never elicited. In this
setting, running a selective trial may prevent the experimenter from building an appropriate
control group.32
Finally, the fact that agents may make inferences from the principal's choice of exper-
imental design may interfere with their behavior. For instance, similar to Milgrom and
Roberts (1986a), if treatment is only available at a high cost, agents may infer that the tech-
31Even the requirement that values be bounded above and below can be dispensed in theory in BDM
mechanisms by picking a distribution of prices with an unbounded support.
32Of course, in a standard open RCT, agents in the control group who highly value the treatment may try
to obtain it. A selective trial may decrease noise by identifying these agents and facilitating their monitoring.
33nology is more valuable. In such environments, a careful principal should take into account
how experimental design inuences behavior before drawing inferences. In addition, in the
spirit of Milgrom and Roberts (1986b); Mullainathan et al. (2008); Rayo and Segal (2008),
or Kamenica and Gentzkow (2009) a principal may want to optimize the structure of her
trial, as well as the information it generates, to improve future adoption by agents.
Extension to Dynamic Mechanisms. Throughout the paper, we focus on mechanisms
which allow us to elicit agents' preferences only once. Note that this could occur either before
or after an agent has been exposed to the technology. In environments where agents learn
over the course of the experiment, it may be valuable to elicit the agents' preferences over
time.33 Consider a technology that requires sustained eort to yield returns, for example:
anti-depressants with delayed eects, technologies exhibiting signicant learning-by-doing,
and so on. Eliciting preferences over time may improve inference by helping to distinguish
agents exhibiting consistent motivation throughout the trial from agents whose motivation
drops in the middle. However, eliciting preferences over time may be complicated when
anticipated treatment status changes current eort expenditure. In particular, if an agent
is promised treatment in future periods to induce a particular current eort level, then it
becomes impossible to elicit preferences in the future without breaking this promise. We
leave the analysis of such mechanisms and their limitations for future work.
Extension to multi-agent mechanisms. The mechanisms considered in this paper are
all single-agent mechanisms|an agent's assignment depends only on the message he sends
and not on the messages sent by others. This allows us to identify the agent's preferences
as well as his beliefs over his own treatment eects and returns to eort. Considering multi-
agent mechanisms, in which assignment depends on the messages sent by others, can allow
33Philipson and Desimone (1997); Philipson and Hedges (1998); Scharfstein et al. (1999); Chan and Hamil-
ton (2006) take a dierent approach to this problem by incorporating the information from observable
non-compliance into econometric models in order to estimate more accurate treatment eects.
34us to identify the agent's beliefs about others' values, others' success rates, and so on.
The information elicited by multiple-agent mechanisms may be useful if there are exter-
nalities between agents, as in Miguel and Kremer (2004), or to get a tighter handle on social
learning. For example, if we observe that most agents have low value for the technology
but believe that others have high value for the technology, this suggests a specic failure of
social learning, and provides us with the means to correct it. Indeed, if most agents do not
expend eort using the technology but believe others do, then agents will interpret others'
poor outcomes as a signal that even with high eort the technology does not yield returns.
Providing the agents with actual data on others' willingness to pay corrects these inference
mistakes and may increase experimentation. Again, we leave more in depth analysis of such
mechanisms to future work.
35Appendix | Not for Publication
A Extensions
A.1 General Outcome Space
Most of the results extend directly to the case where y takes values in a general outcome
space Y , and is distributed according to some density function fy(R;;e;t). We denote by
fy;t(;e) 
R
R fy(R;;e;t)dt(R) the subjective distribution of returns from the perspective
of an agent of type t. Values simply go from being sums of two terms to being integrals.
The only change to the mechanisms we consider is that incentive contracts are now functions











u(y;t)fy;t( = 1;e)dy + (1   )
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[u(y;t) + w(y)]fy;t(;e)dy   c(e;t):
Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 extend directly with these generalized value functions.
Propositions 6 and 7, which identify subjective returns dier as follows. Proposition 7,






which is a direct extension of Proposition 7.
Proposition 6, which deals with blind trials is more dicult to extend as now we have
only a one-dimensional instrument,  2 [0;1] to identify an entire function fy;t rather than







(;t))(y)   fy;t( = 0;e
(;t))(y)]dy (8)
which corresponds to a utility weighted subjective treatment eect given subjectively appro-
priate eort under belief .
A.2 Eliciting Preferences under Non-Quasilinear Utility
The approach developed in this paper largely extends to the case where preferences are
not quasilinear, although we must consider slightly dierent mechanisms. We now consider
utility taking the form u(y;e;p;t) where y 2 Y , e 2 E, p is a monetary outcome and t is the
agent's type.






Say we want to elicit preference over a range (;p) 2 f0;1g[p;p]. We assume for simplicity
that for all such (;p), Vt( = 0;p)  Vt(;p) < Vt( = 1;p): We normalize Vt( = 0;p = p) =
0 and Vt( = 1;p = p) = 1. Consider the following generalization of BDM mechanism: the
agent sends a message m 2 Rf0;1g[p;p], which corresponds to a value function; the principal
randomly picks (;p;) from some continuous distribution over f0;1g[p;p][0;1]; the agent
is assigned (;p) if m(;p) >  and the lottery   ( = 1;p = p) + (1   )  ( = 0;p = p)
otherwise. In this setting it is dominant for the agent to send message m = Vt. Similar
mechanisms allow us to identify indirect preferences in the case of blind and incentivized
trials.
Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 extend directly with these generalized value functions. Again,
extending Propositions 6 and 7 requires some more work. Proposition 6|which identies
37subjective returns to eort using blind trials|extends as is when y 2 f0;1g, and extends
according to equation (8) when y takes values in a general outcome set Y . Proposition 7
extends as is when preferences are separable in money, that is, when u(y;e;p;t) = u0(y;e;t) 
u1(p;t). When preferences are not separable in money, incentivized trials allow us to identify
fy;t(y)@u
@pjy;p for all values of y and p (when preferences are separable, the multiplicative
constant can be identied from the fact that probabilities sum to 1).
B Implementation of Open Selective Trials as Finite
Menus of Lotteries.
The mechanisms described in the paper all use a continuum of messages and elicit the agent's
exact willingness to pay. Of course it is possible to elicit coarser information. This example
shows how to identify which of N intervals an agent's willingness to pay belongs to.
Let the experimenter pick value thresholds  Vmax = V0 < V1 <  < VN = Vmax. She
can elicit the interval where an agent's value lies by oering a menu of lotteries. This menu
is constructed with messages M = f1; ;Ng and any increasing sequence (1) < (2) <
 < (N) of sampling rates. Thus, message m 2 M corresponds to buying the lottery
that delivers the treatment with probability (m). In order to match these messages with
the appropriate value interval, the experimenter simply sets p(m), the price of lottery m,
according to:
8k > 1; p(k) = p(k   1) + ((k)   (k   1))Vk 1: (9)
Note that the sequence of prices is entirely determined by p(1). Denote by G;p the mecha-
nism corresponding to this menu of lotteries, then:
Fact 4. mG;p(Vt) = k if and only if Vt 2 [Vk 1;Vk].
This emphasizes the many degrees of freedom the experimenter has when implementing
selective trials as menus of lotteries. The value intervals according to which agents are
38classied, and the rates according to which they obtain treatment are, to a large extent, free
parameters. Still, sampling rates are increasing in an agent's value.
C A Numerical Example Illustrating Inference from
Incentivized Trials
This section illustrates step by step the process of inference from trial data, starting with
a standard RCT, adding data from open selective trials and concluding by adding both
objective and subjective data from an incentivized trial.
As regards the environment, we return to a setting where returns are two dimensional:
R = (Rb;Re). As before, in the context of a water treatment product, Rb could be the
baseline returns of using the water treatment product only when it is convenient to do so
and Re the returns to using it more thoroughly (for instance, bringing treated water when
away from home). Success rates are given by:
q( =0;e) = 0 and q( =1;e) = Rb + eRe;
where e 2 R+ is the agent's eort provision. An agent with type t has beliefs Rt = (Rb;t;Re;t)
and maximizes Et[y]   c(e) where c(e) = e2
2 : The eort expended in an incentivized trial is
thus e(w;t) = Re;t(1+w), which nests the eort decision of an open trial, e(w=0;t) = Re;t.
Throughout, we illustrate the inference process by considering the case where each pa-
rameter has a low and high value: Re;Re;t 2f1=4;1=2g, Rb 2f0;1=8g and Rb;t 2f0;3=32g.
Each element of a selective trial adds data which will narrow the set of possible values.34
34For simplicity, we consider priors that put point masses on few possible states. Unfortunately, such
strong priors can result in degenerate inference problems. We computed the states to keep the inference
problem well dened and better reect the mechanics of inference from a continuous state space. This
accounts for the somewhat unusual aspect of our parameter values.
39Inference from an RCT. An RCT identies the average treatment eect, b  = Rb +
Re  Re;t. For the numerical values specied above the possible outcomes are described in
the following matrix
Re = 1=2 Re = 1=4
Re;t = 1=2 Re;t = 1=4 Re;t = 1=2 Re;t = 1=4
Rb = 1=8 b  = 3=8 b  = 1=4 b  = 1=4 b  = 3=16
Rb = 0 b  = 1=4 b  = 1=8 b  = 1=8 b  = 1=16
As illustrated by the matrix, if b  2 f1=16;3=16;3=8g this identies the returns of the
technology (Rb;Re). However, treatment eects b  2 f1=8;1=4g are consistent with multiple
true returns.35 In particular, when b  = 1=4, it may be that casual use of the water treatment
product is not particularly eective (Rb = 0), more thorough use is not particularly eective
(Re = 1=4), or more thorough use is eective, but agents don't believe it is, and so do not put
much eort into using the water treatment product more thoroughly (Re = 1=4, Re;t = 1=2).
Inference from a Selective Open Trial. By Fact 1, open selective trials identify treat-
ment eects b . Additionally, by Proposition 1, an open selective trial identies the agent's
willingness to pay for treatment Vt = Rb;t+R2
e;t=2. To illustrate the value of this data, focus
on the case where b  = 1=4. As shown above, this is consistent with three dierent vectors of
(Rb, Re, and Re;t). Based on this, we illustrate the six possible values of Vt in the following
matrix:
35For example, (Rb = 0;Re = 1=2;Re;t = 1=2);(Rb = 1=8;Re = 1=2;Re;t = 1=4) and (Rb = 1=8;Re =
1=4;Re;t = 1=2) are all consistent with b  = 1=4.
Note that agents' beliefs may be self conrming. For instance, an agent who believes that eort has high
returns, Re;t = 1=2, who observes b  = 1=4 will continue to believe returns are high, even though this data
could be generated by Re = 1=4. Such self-conrming beliefs are frequent in the experimentation and social
learning literatures. See for instance Rothschild (1974); Banerjee (1992); Bikhchandani et al. (1992).
40Rb = 0;Re = 1=2;Re;t = 1=2 Rb = 1=8;Re = 1=2;Re;t = 1=4 Rb = 1=8;Re = 1=4;Re;t = 1=2
Rb;t = 3=32 Vt = 7=32 Vt = 1=8 Vt = 7=32
Rb;t = 0 Vt = 1=8 Vt = 1=32 Vt = 1=8
If Vt = 1=32 the data from selective trials indicates Re;t = 1=4 = e. As the treatment
eect is b  = 1=4 the only consistent returns are Rb = 1=8 and Re = 1=2. If Vt = 7=32,
there remains uncertainty since the data is consistent with both (Rb = 0;Re = 1=2) and
(Rb = 0;Re = 1=4). Finally if Vt = 1=8, the data is consistent with any of the states (Rb, Re,
Re;t) that produce b  = 1=4. That is to say that even in this limited example, data from a
selective open trial (and hence, MTEs) may not help in identifying underlying returns. We
now turn to how incentivized trials allow us to infer whether eort or returns to eort are
low.
Inference from an Incentivized Trial. Incentivized trials yield:




As an open selective trial already identies Vt = Vt(w=0) = Rb;t + R2
e;t=2 and b  = b (w=











= ReRe;t. With this data the principal
can identify:























Rb = b    Re  Re;t. The same information can be identied in a mathematically simpler,
but more data intensive, way by identifying w0 and the empirical quantities associated with
that value.
41Altogether, incentivized selective trials allow us to identify both the true returns (Rb;Re)
and the agents' beliefs (Rb;t;Re;t). Thus, in this example, data from a selective incentivized
trial allows an experimenter to determine how eective casual and thorough use of the water
treatment product is without having to observe individual agents' usage. This is possible
as eliciting each agents' indirect preferences over the water treatment product and bonuses
associated with staying healthy allows the experimenter to infer the agents' beliefs about the
eects of casual and more thorough usage. This, in turn, allows the experimenter to infer
behavior and identify the deep structural parameters determining the product's eectiveness,
as well as how beliefs about eectiveness lead to dierent outcomes.
D Proofs
Proof of Fact 1: We break down the data dG in two subsamples (d
0(i)
G )i2N and (d
1(i)
G )i2N
such that 0, 1 are non-decreasing mappings from N to N, and for all i 2 N, 0(i) = 0 and
1(i) = 1. Since 8m; (m) 2 [;1   ], we have that each such subsample is innite and we
can pick 1 and 0 to be strictly increasing from N to N. We dene mapping h (such that
h(dG)  dG0) as follows.
We use the notation h(dG) = (dh





i ). For every i 2 N, we
set mh
i = ;, ph
i = 0, we draw h




(i). It is easy to check that indeed, h(dG)  dG0. 
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof of the rst claim is very similar to that of Fact 1.
Consider a mechanism G = (M;G) such that every player has a strictly dominant strategy.
An agent with value V (ti) chooses a message mi to solve
max
m2M
(m)V (ti)   E(pijmi = m):
42This problem is entirely dened by player i's value V (ti). Since a.e. player has a strictly
optimal message, this problem has a unique solution for a.e. value.
We now construct a mapping h : D ! (D) such that the data generated by G0 can
be simulated from data generated by G using mapping h. For simplicity we describe the
mapping h in the case where M is nite. Given dG, h(dG) is generated as follows.
First, we break down the basic data dG in 2  cardM subsets, according to treatment
 and the message mG(V ) corresponding to the value declared by the agent. Formally, for
all m 2 M and  2 f0;1g, we dene (d
m;(i)
G )i2N the ordered subsequence such that for
all i, mG(Vm;(i)) = m and m;(i) = . Since 0 < infm (m) < supm (m) < 1, all these
subsamples are innite. Hence, m; can be chosen to be strictly increasing from N ! N.
We use these subsamples to simulate data dG0.
Let us denote h(dG) = (dh





i ). We rst set
mh
i = mG0(Vi). Then using G0(mh
i ), we draw values h
i and ph





This denes h : D ! (D). It is easy to check that h(dG)  dG0.36 This concludes the
proof. 
Proof of Fact 2: The fact that the BDM mechanism elicits values is well-known. Since Fp
has full support over [ Vmax;Vmax], assignment to treatment also satises full-support and
the second part of Proposition 1 implies that GBDM is a most informative mechanism. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Agents of type t and t0 are such that Vt > Vt0 and mG(t) 6= mG(t0).
Denote (m) = G( = 1jm) and pm = EG(jm)p. It must be that
(mG(t))Vt   pmG(t) > (mG(t))Vt0   pmG(t)
(mG(t
0))Vt0   pmG(t0) > (mG(t
0))Vt   pmG(t0):
36Note that for the sake of notational simplicity, this construction ends up wasting data points by not
taking consecutive elements from the subsamples. This is inconsequential here since we have innitely many
data points.
43Adding the two inequalities yields that [(mG(t))   (mG(t0))](Vt   Vt0) > 0, which implies
that (mG(t)) > (mG(t0)). 
Proof of Proposition 3: We begin with the rst assertion. Given mechanism G = (M;),
we dene mechanism G0 = (M;0) as follows:
8m 2 M; 
0(m) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
 = 0;p = 0 with probability 
(m) with probability    
 = 1;p = 0 with probability 
Clearly mechanism G0 is strategically equivalent to mechanism G. The proof that G  G0 is
omitted since it is essentially identical to that of Fact 1.
We now turn to the second assertion. Consider two messages m1 and m2 respectively
(and optimally) sent by types with values V1 and V2. Let pm = EG(jm)p. We must have
that
G0(m1)V1   pG0(m1)  G0m2V1   pG0(m2)
G0(m2)V2   pG0(m2)  G0(m1)V2   pG0(m1):
These two inequalities yield that (G0m2   G0m1)V1  pG0(m2)   pG0(m1)  (G0(m2)  
G0(m1))V (t), which implies that jpG0(m2) pG0(m1)j < ( )Vmax. Hence the dierence in
utilities between sending two messages m1 and m2 for an agent with value V 2 [ Vmax;Vmax]
is j(G0(m1)   G0(m2))V   pG0(m1) + pG0(m2)j  2(   )Vmax. 
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof of Proposition 4 is essentially identical to that of
Proposition 1 and hence omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof is given for the general case where there might be mul-
44tiple optimal eort choices. Let Vt(;e) denote the expected value of type t under treatment
status  and when putting eort e. We have that
Vt() = max
e2E
Vt( =1;e) + (1   )Vt( =0;e)
 max
e2E
Vt( =1;e) + (1   )max
e2E
Vt( =0;e):
If argmaxe2E Vt( =1;e)\argmaxVt( =0;e) 6= ;, the inequality is an equality and, since we
normalized Vt(=0) = 0 we obtain that Vt(') = 'Vt(=1). Inversely, if argmaxe2E Vt( =
1;e) \ argmaxVt( =0;e) = ;, the inequality is strict and Vt(') < 'Vt( = 1). 
Proof of Proposition 6: The result follows directly from applying the Envelope Theorem
to equation (4). 
Proof of Proposition 7: The result follows directly from applying the Envelope Theorem
to equation (7). 
Proof of Fact 3: Whenever w = w0, the agent is perfectly insured and Vt( = 1;w) =
Vt( =0;w) since access to the technology is valuable only in so far as it aects outcomes.
We now show that whenever w > w0, Vt( =1;w) > Vt( =0;w). The agent's value is
Vt(;w) = max
e2E
qt(;e)[u(y=1;t)   u(y=0;t) + w] + u(y=0;t)   c(e;t):
Let e
0 be the agent's optimal eort level if  = 0. By assumption, there exists e1 such that
c(e1;t)  c(e
0;t) and qt( = 1;e1) > qt( = 0;e
0). Since w > w0 = u(0;t)   u(1;t), it
follows that the agent gets strictly higher value under conguration ( =1;e1) than under
conguration ( =0;e
0). This concludes the proof. 
45Proof of Fact 4: Indeed, mG;p(V ) = k if and only if for all k0 6= k,
V k   pk > V k0   pk0: (10)
For k0 < k, this last condition is equivalent to V  maxk0<kf(pk  pk0)=(k  k0)g, which in
turn is equivalent to V > Vk 1. Similarly, for k0 > k, equation (10) is equivalent to Vk > V .
This concludes the proof. 
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